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Submission on Human Rights Act Reform Consultation—Q16: Should the proposal for
prospective quashing orders be extended to proceedings under the proposed Bill of Rights?
1.

I am an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver,
Canada. I previously practised and taught law in London, England. My scholarly research
concerns the overlapping doctrines of Prospective Quashing (i.e. judicially quashing
government acts with non-retrospective effect) and Prospective Overruling (i.e. judicially
overruling court precedents with non-retrospective effect). I write this submission in my
personal capacity and not behalf of my university or law school.

2.

I oppose the proposal in Question 16 of the Human Rights Act Reform Consultation to
extend prospective quashing orders to proceedings under human rights law. I express no
view here on suspended quashing orders, although I would urge the Government to
consider experiences and critiques of this doctrine in comparable common law
jurisdictions such as Canada before enacting this novel reform.1

3.

I have previously expressed opposition to prospective quashing orders in my submissions
to the Judicial Review Reform Consultation2 and the House of Commons General
Committee on the Judicial Review and Courts Bill 152,3 as well as in a contribution on the
UK Constitutional Law Blog.4 My reasons, in summary, are as follows:
a.

1

Prospective Quashing violates Professor A.V. Dicey’s canonical three meanings
of the Rule of Law:5 (i) Supremacy of law: the technique allows unlawful executive
action to govern past events without remedy, enabling rule by arbitrary power rather
than rule by the regular law; (ii) Equality before law: the technique gives the
Government a remedial shield in litigation that is not available to ordinary people,
contrary to the principle of equality under law; (iii) Ordinary law: the technique
undermines the aspiration that ‘where there is a right, there is a remedy’, by
abolishing the ordinary retrospective remedies for rights-violations.
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b.

The premise of prospective quashing, ‘that legal certainty, and hence the Rule of
Law, may be best served by only prospectively invalidating’ impugned acts,6 is
contradicted by the leading mainstream theories of adjudication in the
common law world, including the jurisprudence advanced by Professors H.L.A.
Hart, Joseph Raz, John Finnis, Ronald Dworkin, and John Gardner.7 Legislating to
create a prospective quashing power would usher in a radical change to the judicial
method without any adequately articulated theoretical or Rule-of-Law justification.

c.

Prospective Quashing draws judges into making policy and encourages judicial
activism.8 This statutory reform has roots in an American doctrine developed by
reformist jurists who sought to untether US judges from the constraint of
retrospective judicial decision-making as a way to facilitate more radical judicial
changes in the law. The technique leads to more uncertainty, instability, and
inefficiency in the law, and more policy balancing in the courts, not less.

d.

Prospective Quashing is inconsistent with the English common law judicial
method and the declaratory theory of adjudication that underpins common law
reasoning.9 The Government’s proposal would fundamentally change the nature of
judging in the UK. The idea that judges can separate the forward-looking
precedential effects of their decisions from the backward-looking retrospective
effects contravenes orthodox understandings of the common law judicial method.
Lord Devlin thought such a proposal ‘crosses the Rubicon that divides the judicial
and the legislative powers. It turns judges into undisguised legislators.’ He warned
that to cross that Rubicon—as the Government’s proposal does—‘would be to make
a profound constitutional change with incalculable consequences’.10

e.

Prospective Quashing is doctrinally unprincipled and has been denounced by
prominent apex courts around the common law world. The High Court of
Australia has rejected the doctrine of judicial non-retrospectivity as ‘inconsistent
with’ and ‘a perversion of judicial power’.11 The United States Supreme Court has
abandoned it.12 In Canada it is a rarely-invoked exceptional resort. The
Government’s prospective quashing proposal is an unprecedented reform. It would
isolate the courts of the United Kingdom from influencing, and drawing influence
from, comparable common law jurisdictions.

f.

Prospective Quashing is unnecessary and has been rejected by scholars who
have analysed the doctrine in England.13 It is superfluous given the (relatively
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more moderate) proposal of enacting a constrained suspended quashing power.
When the Government disagrees with the reasoning or outcome of a judgment, the
proper solution is to enact legislation changing the law (if necessary, with
retroactive effect).
4.

The Government should abandon its proposals to legislate for prospective quashing orders
in the human rights and judicial review contexts.

5.

If the Government does proceed with introducing prospective quashing orders into English
law, it should not be in the form currently presented in clause 1 of the Judicial Review and
Courts Bill 152. Regarding the specific provisions of Clause 1, subsection (9) should not
be part of the law. The exercise of this extraordinary power should be left to the discretion
of the judge having regard to the context of each case.

Assistant Professor Samuel Beswick
4 March 2022
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